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Abstract 
Propositional models of evaluative conditioning postulate that the impact of stimulus 
pairings on liking should depend not on the pairings themselves but on what the pairings imply 
about the relation between stimuli. Hence, context manipulations that change the implications of 
stimulus pairings should moderate evaluative conditioning. We manipulated context by varying the 
way in which context cues were paired with affective outcomes while keeping the pairings between 
target cues and affective outcomes constant. All participants saw one target cue compound that was 
followed by a positive outcome (XF+) and another target cue compound that was followed by a 
negative outcome (YG-). In condition Same, each context cue was consistently paired with a 
positive or negative outcome, regardless of whether it was presented alone or in compound with 
another cue (A+, B+, AB+; C-, D-, CD-). In condition Opposite, however, a context cue was paired 
with a certain outcome when presented alone and with an outcome of the opposite valence when 
presented in a compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB-; C-, D-, CD+). Employing several implicit 
measures, we assessed the implicit evaluations of the target cues X and Y. In all three studies, the 
outcome of the measurement procedure differed between conditions. In condition Same, the 
positively paired cue X was evaluated more positively than the negatively paired cue Y. In 
condition Opposite, however, this preference was not present. This pattern of results suggests that 
EC is determined not only by the objective pairings but also by the context in which these pairings 
occur. Implications for models of evaluative conditioning are discussed. 
(262 words) 
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Context Effects in Evaluative Conditioning of Implicit Evaluations 
Because preferences drive behavior, cognition, and emotion, it is important to understand 
how those likes and dislikes are formed and how they can be influenced. Research has shown that 
people do not necessarily evaluate stimuli in a conscious, controlled and intentional manner. As 
Zajonc (1980) argued in his seminal paper, evaluations can arise also in a spontaneous, 
uncontrolled, unconscious, efficient and fast manner. We refer to this type of automatic preferences 
as implicit evaluations, whereas we refer to non-automatic preferences as explicit evaluations.
1
 
Implicit evaluations have been shown to play a crucial role in many important psychological 
phenomena including psychopathology (see Roefs et al., 2011), addiction (Wiers & Stacy, 2006), 
and social interactions (Fazio & Olson, 2003).  
Implicit evaluations often arise as the result of repeated experiences. For example, the 
implicit evaluation of a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) might be changed by repeatedly 
pairing it with an affectively relevant (positive or negative) stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, US). 
A change in liking that occurs as the result of pairings of stimuli is typically referred to as 
evaluative conditioning (EC; De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, 
De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). EC can involve changes in both explicit and 
implicit evaluations. Hence, implicit evaluations that result from the repeated pairing of stimuli are 
a subset of EC effects, namely those EC effects that involve changes in automatic rather than non-
automatic evaluations. 
At a mental process level, it is often assumed that EC of both implicit and explicit 
evaluations is due to the slow and gradual formation of associations in mind, that is, of unqualified 
links between mental representations. This view is endorsed by several associative (e.g., Baeyens, 
Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992) and dual process models (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Dual process models of evaluations postulate the 
existence of two separate but interacting mental systems of processing: an associative, impulsive 
system which is responsible for the formation of implicit evaluations and a propositional, reflective 
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system which is responsible for the formation of explicit evaluations (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 
2006). The associative system consists of a network of mental representations that are linked via 
unqualified associations. Associations are typically assumed to result from the direct experience of 
stimulus pairings. Once an association has been formed between the CS and US representations as 
the result of CS-US pairings, presentation of the CS not only results in the activation of the CS 
representation but also, via automatic spreading of activation, in the automatic activation of the US 
representation. As a result, the originally neutral CS will evoke implicit evaluations that are in line 
with the valence of the US. Under certain conditions, the automatic activation of the US 
representation can bias explicit CS evaluations as well and thus lead to EC of explicit evaluations 
(see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, for details). In sum, dual process models typically locate the 
source of EC effects, particularly those involving implicit evaluations, within an associative system.  
Recently, single process models have been proposed that reject the existence of an 
associative system. More specifically, propositional models attribute all instances of EC (and other 
types of associative learning
2
) to the non-automatic formation of propositions about stimulus 
relations (e.g., De Houwer, 2007, 2009b; Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009). Propositions are 
statements about the world that can be true or untrue. They can specify not only that two stimuli are 
related, but also the way in which the stimuli are related (e.g., that the stimuli simply co-occur or 
that one stimulus causes another stimulus). Because the impact of stimulus pairings on evaluative 
and other responses is, according to propositional models, mediated by the formation of 
propositions, EC can occur only after a proposition about the stimulus pairings has been formed and 
will depend on the content of the proposition that is formed. 
Propositional models also incorporate several other assumptions that generate a number of 
interesting predictions. First, the formation of propositions is assumed to be a non-automatic 
process that requires awareness and cognitive resources. Hence, propositional models postulate that 
EC and other types of associative learning should depend on awareness of the stimulus pairings. 
Although there have been reports of unaware EC, questions have been raised about the validity of 
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these findings (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009), and many studies have failed  
to find EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & 
Yzerbyt, 2007; Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis showed that 
awareness of the stimulus pairings was by far the biggest moderator of the size of EC effects 
(Hofmann et al., 2010). Second, it is assumed that propositions can be formed not only on the basis 
of direct experience but also on the basis of instructions or inferences (De Houwer, 2009). In line 
with this assumption, De Houwer (2006) showed that merely informing participants about stimulus 
pairings without actually presenting these pairings is enough to induce EC effects (see also Gast & 
De Houwer, in press). Third, it has been proposed that after the non-automatic formation of a 
proposition, the proposition can be stored in memory from which it can be retrieved automatically 
(e.g., Bar-Anan, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2010; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). This 
latter assumption allows propositional models to explain EC of implicit evaluations.  
In the present paper, we report studies that were inspired by the central idea of propositional 
models, namely that the effect of CS-US pairings on liking should depend on the content of the 
proposition about the CS-US relation rather than on the pairings themselves. Importantly, the same 
objective CS-US pairings could lead to propositions about the CS-US relation with different content 
depending on the context in which those pairings are presented. For instance, if a neutral stimulus 
co-occurs with a positive stimulus (e.g., a neutral nonword and a positive word) in a context in 
which this implies that the neutral stimulus actually has negative properties (e.g., when the 
nonwords are said to be antonyms of the existing words), such co-occurrences should lead to the 
formation of negative propositions about the initially neutral stimulus (e.g., the nonword has a 
negative meaning). As a result, the originally neutral stimulus should become negative even though 
it was paired with positive stimuli. Recent studies support this prediction. For instance, Förderer 
and Unkelbach (2011; see also Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2010) showed that neutral faces paired with 
positive pictures were rated less positive than neutral faces paired with negative pictures when 
participants were told that the depicted people loathed the pictures they were paired with. At a 
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functional level, studies such as these are important because they show that the effect of stimulus 
pairings on liking depends on the (verbal) context in which they are presented. At the level of 
mental process theories, they provide support for propositional models of EC.  
It is a different question, however, whether this type of context effects can be found also for 
EC of implicit evaluations. Assuming that in particular implicit evaluations are determined by 
associations in memory and that associations in memory are determined by actual stimulus pairings 
(e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006), one could predict that EC of implicit evaluations will reflect 
stimulus pairings independent of what the context implies about the way in which the CS and US 
are related.  Therefore, observing context effects on EC of implicit evaluations would constrain 
theories about the determinants of implicit evaluations more than observing context effects on EC 
of explicit evaluations. 
A recent study suggests that contextual information about the way CS and US are related 
can also moderate EC of  implicit evaluations. Peters and Gawronski (2011) presented pictures of 
four neutral faces (CSs), two paired with a number of positive descriptions (USs+), and two paired 
with a number of negative descriptions (USs-). After each trial, participants were explicitly told 
whether the pairing they had just seen was true or false. If the pairing  was said to provide false 
information, participants were asked to “mentally reverse” the pairing (e.g., when someone was 
described as SAD, they should infer that this person was HAPPY). Employing an affective 
misattribution procedure (AMP, Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005) and an affective priming 
task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) to capture implicit evaluations of the CSs, they 
found that EC effects depended not only on the valence of the USs but also on the relational 
information (true vs. false) that was presented right after each pairing. In particular, a standard EC 
effect (i.e., preference for CSs paired with positive USs over CSs paired with negative USs) was 
found when the pairings were said to provide correct information. However, when pairings were 
said to provide false information, a reversed EC effect was observed (i.e., more negative rating for 
CSs paired with positive USs than for CSs paired with negative USs).   
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In the current research, we wanted to investigate further whether and when EC of implicit 
evaluations is moderated by the context in which pairings are presented. Unlike earlier studies 
(Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011; Peters & Gawronski, 2011), we manipulated the context in an 
indirect way, that is, without verbally instructing participants about how the CS and US are related.  
Moreover, our context manipulation was embedded in a traditional EC procedure that involved 
pairings of single stimuli as CSs and USs rather than statements or personality trait descriptions as 
used by Peters and Gawronski (2011). More specifically, we manipulated relational information by 
presenting the target CS-US pairings in the context of other pairings that followed a certain rule.  A 
first CS X was always presented in compound with cue F and was always paired with a positive US 
(i.e., winning a game; XF+). A second CS Y always occurred in compound with cue G and was 
always paired with a negative US (i.e., losing a game; YG-). In addition to these target compounds, 
we also presented context cues and manipulated the rule that determined when a context cue was 
paired with a win or a loss. In condition Same, a context cue was always followed by the same US 
regardless of whether it was presented alone or in compound with another cue (i.e., A+, B+, AB+, 
C-, D-, CD-). In condition Opposite, however, a context cue was followed by a different US when it 
was presented on its own than when it was presented in compound with another cue (i.e., A+, B+, 
AB-, C-, D-, CD+).  Our dependent measure was the implicit and explicit evaluation of the two 
target stimuli X and Y when presented on their own (and thus in the absence of the cues F and G 
with which they appeared on compound trials).   
Different mental process models of EC on implicit measures make different predictions 
regarding the outcome of our studies. Regarding the condition Same, all currently available models 
make the same predictions. Although postulating different mediating processes, in functional terms 
they would all expect a standard EC effect, that is, a change in implicit evaluation of the CSs that 
reflects the valence of the USs they co-occurred with. The models do, however, make different 
predictions about whether this effect will also be found  in condition Opposite. A purely associative 
account of EC of implicit evaluations implies that the change in implicit evaluation is driven simply 
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by associations that are formed between stimuli that co-occurred. Importantly, in both conditions, 
the target stimulus X was paired with a positive outcome (XF+) whereas target stimulus Y was 
paired with a negative outcome. Because the pairings involving X and Y were identical in both 
conditions, the implicit evaluations of the target stimuli X and Y should not differ between the 
conditions Same and Opposite. In both cases, X should be evaluated more positively than Y.  
A propositional account, on the other hand, would predict different EC effects in condition 
Same than in condition Opposite. In condition Same, the context pairings (A+, B+, AB+, C-, D-, 
CD-) imply that a stimulus is paired with the same US when presented on its own  and when 
presented in compound with another stimulus. Based on this information, participants can infer 
from the XF+ and YG- trials that X on its own will be followed by a positive outcome and that Y on 
its own would be followed by a negative outcome. Hence our dependent measure  (i.e., the 
evaluation of X and Y in the absence of their paired compound cues F and G) should reflect the 
valence of the paired USs. In condition Opposite, however, the context pairings (A+, B+, AB-, C-, 
D-, CD+) imply that a cue is paired with different outcomes when presented alone than when 
presented in compound. Hence, the XF+ pairings imply that X on its own will be followed by a 
negative outcome whereas Y would be followed by a positive outcome. Therefore in this case, the 
evaluation of X and Y when presented on their own, should reflect the opposite of the valence of 
the US with which they were paired. Provided that participants indeed use the context trials to form 
propositions about the X-US and Y-US relations, and transfer the rule from the context pairings to 
the target pairings, propositional models would thus predict that participants will prefer X over Y in 
condition Same but will prefer Y over X in condition Opposite.  
Finally, a third possible scenario for condition Opposite would be a significant reduction of 
the EC effect compared to condition Same but not a reversal. This result would allow for two 
theoretical interpretations. A propositional account of such a result would entail that participants 
form two competing propositions, one based on the experienced co-occurrences and another based 
on the rule implied by the context pairs. Whereas these two propositions would lead to the same 
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preferences in condition Same (e.g. “X goes with F and with win” and “X on its own goes with 
win”) this would not be the case for condition Opposite (e.g., “X goes with F and with win” and “X 
on its own goes with loss”). This might result in a preference  for X over Y in condition Same but 
not in condition Opposite. Such a pattern of results, however, would also be in line with a hybrid 
account that assumes that both associative and propositional processes contribute to implicit EC 
effects. Whereas both processes would result in a preference  for X over Y in condition Same, they 
would oppose each other in condition Opposite. For instance, the XF+ pairings would result in an 
association between X and winning (and thus a liking of X) but in the proposition that X on its own 
will be followed by a loss (and thus a disliking of X). Hence, in condition Opposite, X will not be 
liked more than Y.   
In sum, if we observe that X and Y are evaluated differently in condition Same than in 
condition Opposite (either reversed or reduced effects in condition Opposite), this would support 
the idea that propositional processes (co-)determine EC of implicit evaluations. In addition, it would 
go beyond the study of Peters and Gawronski (2011) by showing that context effects in EC of 
implicit evaluations are not limited to the rather atypical EC procedure that they used in which USs 
were explicitly said to provide a true or false description of the personality of the CSs.  
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
In three studies, we examined  context effects in the following manner (see De Houwer & 
Vandorpe, 2010, for a similar approach in research on causal learning). Participants were informed 
that on each trial of a learning phase, they would see the picture of a slot machine frame on the 
screen. The slot machine had two displays, one at its top and one at its bottom. On each trial, the top 
one displayed one or two neutral nonwords, whereas the bottom one displayed an outcome that 
could either be a win or a loss. Participants were instructed that each nonword or compound of 
nonwords would be the cause of the respective outcome, that could either be a win or a loss. We 
refer to different nonwords with different letters (A-G, X and Y), to a win with “+”, and to a loss 
with “-“. In condition Opposite, participants experienced the pairings A+, B+, AB-, C-, D-, CD+, 
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XF+, YH-. In condition Same, participants experienced the pairings A+, B+, AB+, C-, D-, CD-, 
XF+, YH-. The stimuli X and F which are in the learning phase always presented in compound with 
the stimuli, F and H, respectively, serve as CSs. After the repeated presentation of these pairings, 
we measured the implicit evaluations of the single stimuli X and Y, employing a range of implicit 
measures, that is, measures of implicit evaluations. More specifically, in Experiment 1, we used the 
implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998), in Experiment 2 the 
personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004), and in Experiment 3 the affective priming task (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). We employed a variety of implicit measures to ensure that our 
conclusions  were not specific to one particular measure.  
 Method 
We report all three studies in the same section because in all three studies we employed the 
same procedure during the learning phase. The only major difference between experiments 
concerned the nature of the measure of implicit evaluations.  
 Participants. All participants were students at Ghent University. Fifty-six students 
participated in Experiment 1 (mean age = 18.64, SD = 1.77; 68% women), 46 in Experiment 2 
(mean age = 19.63, SD= 2.86; 83% women); and 50 in Experiment 3 (mean age = 19.64, SD= 2.75; 
76% women). All participants were native Dutch speakers. For their participation in the 
experiments, they were  given either course credits or four Euros. 
 Materials.  
Materials Learning phase. Each cue and outcome appeared on one of two displays of a slot-
machine picture, which was presented on a computer screen in the size of 26 (height) x 17 (width) 
cm. The cues appeared on a display  at the top, whereas the outcomes appeared on a display  at the 
bottom. In all three experiments, eight nonsense words (“BAYRAM”, “ENANWAL”, 
“UDIBNON”, “KADIRGA”, “LOKANTA”, “SARICIK”, “FEVKANI” and “NIJARON”) were 
used as stimuli during the learning phase. The nonwords “LOKANTA” and “FEVKANI” were the 
target stimuli, whereas the other nonwords constituted the set of context stimuli. All context and 
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target stimuli were written in black , upper case letters, and in the font “Arial Black”, font size 40. 
We used nonsense words to avoid any potential pre-experimental association between our stimuli 
and the outcomes. The positive outcome was the Dutch word for “win” (“winst”), presented in 
green color, upper case letters, and in the font “Britannic Bold”, font size 100.The negative outcome 
was the Dutch word for “loss” (“verlies”), presented in red color, upper case letters, and in the font 
“Haettenschweiler”, font size 100. The positive outcome was presented together with a pleasant 
sound (a soft melody) and several pictures of 2 euro coins. The negative outcome was presented 
together with an unpleasant sound (a loud buzzer) and two cartoon pictures of a sad face.  
Materials Measurement phase. In Experiment 1, we employed an implicit association test 
designed to measure the evaluation of the target words (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998). In this IAT, 
the attribute stimuli referring to the category positive were the Dutch words for “happy” 
(“gelukkig”), “honest” (“eerlijk”), “pleasant” (“prettig”) and “sincere” (“oprecht”). The attribute 
stimuli for the category negative were the Dutch words for “mean” (“gemeen”), “rude” (“brutaal”), 
“aggressive” (“agressief”) and “deceptive” (“bedrieglijk”). The target stimuli were the cues X and 
Y (“LOKANTA” and “FEVKANI”). As we were interested in the single nonwords X and Y, we 
deviated from the standard IAT procedure by using only one stimulus for each of the target 
categories. To avoid that stimuli were classified only on the basis of simple perceptual features, 
each target stimulus was presented in four different fonts (lower case Arial Black, upper case Arial 
Black, lower case Fixedsys, and upper case Fixedsys), resulting in 8 different target stimuli. De 
Houwer (2006) showed the reliability of this procedural modification and its suitability to capture 
recent learning. 
In Experiment 2, we employed a personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) which differed 
from the standard IAT in two important ways. First, the attribute labels were “I like” (“Heb  ik 
graag”) and “I don’t like” (“Heb ik niet graag”), instead of “positive” and “negative”, and second, 
there was no error feedback for the stimuli of the attribute categories. In addition to that, the 
attribute stimuli were selected in such a way that their valence could easily be judged in a personal 
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(e.g., non-normative) manner. We used the Dutch words for “holiday” (“vakantie”), “summer” 
(“zomer”), “gift” (“cadeau”), “party” (“feest”). The attribute stimuli for the negative category were 
the Dutch words for “war” (“oorlog”), “vomit” (“braaksel”), “accident” (“ongeluk”), “divorce” 
(“scheiding”). As in Experiment 1, the target stimuli were different perceptual instantiations of the 
nonwords “lokanta” and “fevkani”. 
In Experiment 3, we applied an affective priming procedure (Fazio, et al., 1995). As targets 
we used the positive and negative attributes from Experiment 1. The nonwords X and Y were used 
as primes. 
All tasks were presented on an Intel Core2 Duo PC with a 19'' 100 Hz monitor, screen 
resolution 1280 by 1024 pixels, and implemented using  custom made Inquisit 2.0 programs. For 
each implicit measure, the responses were given by pressing the key A (left key) or the key P (right 
key) on a standard AZERTY keyboard. 
 Procedure. At the beginning of each experiment, participants were informed that 
they would see a series of trials in a slot machine game. They were told that each trial consisted of 
the presentation of one or two slot-machine words, followed by a winning or losing outcome. Their 
task was to identify which of the presented slot-machine words predicted a win and which predicted 
a loss. They were asked to detect and remember this information because it was important for 
another upcoming task. Finally, we took measures to ensure that participants would register the rule 
that determined the outcome of the context cues. From the perspective of propositional models, 
detection of the context rule is a precondition for finding an impact of this context element on EC. 
In all experiments, participants were therefore told that a hidden rule regulated the presentation of 
the slot-machine words and their outcome and were asked to try to discover the rule from the series 
of stimuli. In Experiment 2, we implemented an additional measure by actually informing the 
participants about the nature of the rule. That is, in condition Opposite, participants were told that 
words presented in compound result in the opposite outcome than when presented alone. In 
condition Same, they were told that words presented in compound produce the same outcome as 
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when presented alone. Although these measures imply that we cannot draw strong conclusions 
about whether participants can learn these kinds of rules in a spontaneous manner, they are 
instrumental for determining whether the rules that operate in a certain context can moderate EC of 
implicit evaluations. In any case,  unlike  the case in previous related studies (e.g., Förderer & 
Unkelback, 2011; Peters & Gawronski, 2011), participants were not directly instructed about how 
CS-US pairings should be interpreted.  
After the instruction page, participants could start the learning task by pressing a key. Each 
trial of the learning task represented a slot-machine game. A trial started with the presentation of the 
picture of a slot-machine, together with one or two nonword(s) which appeared at the top display 
position for 2000 ms. Then the outcome (the Dutch word for “win” or “loss”) was added on a 
second display at the bottom of the slot-machine, together with the pleasant or unpleasant sound. 
The nonword(s) and the outcome remained on the screen together for 3000 ms during which the 
sound was also present. The next trial started after an inter trial interval of 3000 ms during which 
the screen was blank and no sounds were played. The sequence of trials presented was the 
following. First, A+, B+, and AB+ (Condition Same) or A+, B+, and AB- (Condition Opposite) 
trials were presented twice each, resulting in a block of six trials (Block 1). This block was followed 
by C-, D-, and CD- (Condition Same) or C-, D-, and CD+ (Condition Opposite) trials, each 
presented twice, resulting in another block of six trials (Block 2). The series of pairings of Block 1 
and Block 2 constituted the context, that varied between conditions. Finally, for both condition 
Same and Opposite, the target trials XF+ and YH- were presented  two times each, resulting in a 
final block of four trials (Block 3). Block 3 constituted the series of target pairings of our design. 
This sequence of three blocks of trials was presented five times, adding up to a learning phase of 
eighty trials. Exclusively in Experiment 2, the trials of Block 1 (the pairings of the stimuli A, B and 
AB) and of Block 2 (the pairings of the stimuli C, D and CD) were only presented one time per 
block, instead of twice (like in Experiment 1 and 3). This was an attempt to shorten the learning 
phase and thus keep participants focused during the whole learning phase. The trial order within 
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blocks was determined randomly for each participant and block separately, and the assignment of 
the cues X or Y to the positive or negative outcome was counterbalanced across participants. 
After the presentation of all learning trials, participants performed an implicit measure with 
which we aimed to assess the implicit evaluation of the target stimuli X and Y. In Experiment 1, we 
applied an IAT (Greenwald et al, 1998). Our IAT consisted of seven phases: a target discrimination 
phase (B1), an attribute discrimination phase (B2), a combined (targets and attributes) practice 
phase (B3), a combined (targets and attributes) phase (B4), a reversed target discrimination phase 
(B5), a reversed combined practice phase (B6), and a reversed combined phase (B7). Phases (B1), 
(B2), and (B5) served only for practice, whereas Phases (B3), (B4), (B6) and (B7) were the 
combined test phases that served as measures of implicit evaluation. Before each phase, participants 
were informed about the assignment of the different categories to the left and right key. During the 
target and reversed target discrimination phase (B1 and B5), each target stimulus was presented 
four times, resulting in 32 trials. During the attribute discrimination phase (B2), each attribute 
stimulus was presented four times, also resulting in 32 trials. Finally, both combined phases 
consisted of two blocks (practice – B3 and B6 -  and test phase – B4 and B7) of 32 trials each. In 
each block of these phases, each attribute and target stimulus was presented twice. During the 
reversed combined phase, the assignment of targets to response keys was opposite to the assignment 
during the other combined phase. The assignment of the target categories to the two response keys 
(e.g., during Phases B1, B3, and B4, press left for X and right for Y or vice versa) was 
counterbalanced across participants. Whether the X-positive / Y-negative task (e.g., X assigned to 
the same key as positive attributes and Y assigned to the same key as negative attributes) was 
presented before or after the X-negative / Y-positive IAT task (e.g., X assigned to the negative key 
and Y assigned to the positive key) was thus also counterbalanced across participants. The order of 
trials in each phase was determined randomly. On each trial, a word was presented in the  center of 
the screen until a valid response (pressing key A or P) was registered. If the response was correct, 
the next word appeared after 400 ms. If the response was incorrect, a red cross was presented for 
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400 ms, also in the  center of the screen. In this case, the next word was presented 400 ms after the 
red cross had disappeared. 
 In Experiment 2, we employed a personalized IAT (see Olson & Fazio, 2004). The 
procedure was identical to the standard IAT in Experiment 1, except for two modifications that are 
characteristic  of the personalized IAT: Firstly, the attribute category labels were the Dutch words 
for “I like” instead of “Positive” and “I don’t like” instead of “Negative”. Secondly, there was no 
error feedback for the attribute stimuli. (see Materials section). 
In Experiment 3, we applied an affective priming procedure. Each trial started with a 500- 
ms presentation of a fixation star in the  center of the screen. Next, one of the cues was presented as 
prime for 200 ms, immediately followed by the target (stimulus onset asynchrony of 200 ms), both 
in the  center of the screen. The task was to categorize the targets as quickly as possible as positive 
or negative by pressing one of two keys. Once a response was  made, the next trial started after an 
intertrial interval of 1000 ms. After 16 practice trials, participants completed a block of 128 test 
trials in which combinations of the primes (2) and the positive (4) or negative (4) targets were 
realized equally often, and presented in random order.  
 For exploratory reasons, after performing the implicit measure, participants were also asked 
to rate, on a 9-point Likert scale, the pleasantness of cues A, C, X, Y, XF, and YH. The ratings for 
the cues A and C (presented in a random order)  were given first, followed by the ratings for the 
cues X and Y (presented in a random order), and finally the ratings for the compounds XF and YH 
(also presented in a random order). Subsequently, participants were asked to judge for cues A and C 
first (presented in a random order), and then for cues X and Y (also presented in a random order) to 
what extent they were likely to cause “win” or “loss” in a potential new slot-machine game. This 
question served as a measure of the  causal relations learning between stimuli and outcomes. After 
the causal ratings, participants were asked to report whether they had discovered the context rule 
and, if so, to write it down. Finally, but only in Experiments 2 and 3, participants received a list of 
all stimuli (single and compounds) they experienced in the learning phase. They were asked to 
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indicate, for each of the presented cues (A, B, C, D) and combinations of cues (AB, CD, XF, YH), 
the outcome it was paired with. This series of questions served as a measure of contingency 
awareness. After this last questionnaire was completed, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 Results 
 Experiment 1  
IAT. IAT scores were calculated using the D600 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek and 
Banaji, 2003). Trials in Blocks 3 and 6 of the IAT were entered as mixed practice blocks whereas 
trials in Blocks 4 and 7 were treated as mixed test blocks. A positive value for the D600 indicates 
better performance in the X-positive / Y-negative IAT block than in the X-negative / Y-positive 
IAT block. In other words, a positive value represents implicit evaluations in line with the target 
pairings (X paired with win and Y with loss). Although it is well known that caution is required 
when interpreting the absolute value of IAT scores (e.g., Blanton & Jaccard, 2006), we believe that 
a positive value of our IAT scores can be interpreted as reflecting a preference for X over Y. Unlike  
the case in most IAT studies, the target stimuli that we used were nonwords that were unknown to 
the participants before the experiment. Moreover, a nonword functioned equally often as cue X and 
cue Y. Hence, the direction of the IAT score (positive or negative) can reflect only the acquired 
relative preference of X compared to Y.  
Most importantly, the difference between the two conditions was significant, t(54) = 2.21, p  
= .031, d = 0.58. In condition Same, the D600 measure was positive (M = 0.23, SE = 0.11) and 
significantly different from zero, t(27) = 2.09, p  = .046, d = 0.40. In condition Opposite, the D600 
measure was negative (M = - 0.10, SE = 0.10) but did not significantly differ from zero, t(27) = -.98, 
ns.  
Explicit valence ratings.  Our experiments do not allow for strong conclusions regarding EC 
of explicit evaluations because explicit evaluations were always assessed after the implicit measure. 
Nevertheless, for exploratory reasons, we did conduct Cue x Condition ANOVAs on the explicit 
valence ratings for the target cues X and Y. For this experiment and all subsequent experiments, the 
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relevant mean explicit valence ratings can be found in Table 1. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of cue, F(1, 54) = 5.40, p = .024, but not of condition, F(1, 54) = 1.77, p =.19. 
Furthermore, the interaction between cue and condition was significant, F(1, 54) = 10.96, p < .01, 
ns, partial η2=.17. A post-hoc t-test showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(27) = 
4.247, p < .01, d = 0.80, but not in condition Opposite, t(27) = -0.66, p = .51. This pattern of results 
reflects that of the IAT data. The Pearson correlation between implicit and explicit ratings (for the 
cues X and Y) was also significant, r = .52, p < 01.  
Causal ratings. Cue x Condition ANOVAs were also conducted on the causal ratings of the 
target cues X and Y (see Table 2 for all relevant means for Experiments 1-3). The analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of the cue, F(1, 54) = 16.50, p < .01, partial η2=.23, but no effect of the 
condition, F(1, 54) < 1. We also found an interaction, F(1, 54) = 38.84, p < .01, partial η2=.42. A 
post-hoc t-test showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(27) = 10.80, p < .01, d = 
2.04, but not in condition Opposite, t(27) = -1.23, p = .23. Hence, in condition Same, participants 
indicated that, in a potential new game, the cues X and Y would be followed by the outcome 
predicted by the context rule, whereas in condition Opposite this effect was not present.  
. Experiment 2 
Personalized IAT. As in Experiment 1, we used the D600 scoring algorithm (Greenwald et 
al., 2003). Data of the participants who, when asked at the end of the experiment, did not remember 
correctly the pairings of the test compounds XF and YH (n = 11), were excluded from the analyses. 
We did so because, according to the assumptions of propositional models, awareness of the 
contingencies is a crucial factor in the process of proposition formation. Furthermore, people who 
did not remember the target pairings may have had a distorted memory and might actually have 
formed a proposition different from what was implied in the learning phase. Within this sample (n = 
35), the difference between the two conditions was significant, t(33) = 2.10, p = .044, d = 0.68. In 
condition Same, the D600 measure was positive (M = 0.23, SE = 0.08) and significantly different 
from zero, t(19) = 2.66, p =.015, d = 0.60. In condition Opposite, it was negative (M = - 0.10, SE = 
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0.14) but not significantly different from zero, t(14) = -0.71, ns. Note that the difference between 
conditions was no longer significant when all participants were included in the analysis, t(44) = 
1.39, ns.  
Explicit valence ratings. Also for the valence ratings and the causal ratings reported below, 
only the analyses for the participants who correctly retrieved the target compound co-occurrences 
will be reported. The analysis for the test cues X and Y did not reveal a significant effect of cue, F(1, 
33) = 2.62, p = .12, partial η2=.07, nor of condition, F(1.33) = 3.09, p = .09, partial η2=.08. The 
interaction Cue x Condition was not significant, F(1,33) = 2.62, p = .12, partial η2=.07. The Pearson 
correlation between implicit and explicit ratings of the cues X and Y was marginally significant, r 
= .33, p = .05. 
Causal ratings. For the test cues X and Y, the ANOVA did reveal a significant main effect 
of the cue, F(1, 33) = 4.24, p = .047, partial η2=.11, but not of condition, F(1, 33) < 1. The Cue x 
Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 33) = 30.58, p <.01, partial η2=.48. A post-hoc t-test 
showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(19) = 6.53, p < .01, d = 1.46, and a 
marginal effect in condition Opposite, t(14) = -2.02, p = .06. Therefore, in condition Same, 
participants indicated that, in a potential new game, the cues X and Y would be followed by the 
outcome predicted by the context rule, whereas in condition Opposite this effect was only 
marginally significant.  
 Experiment 3 
Affective priming. Trials in which an incorrect response was given (7. 90% of all trials) 
were discarded. All latencies were pre-processed by discarding latencies that were outliers in an 
individual’s reaction time distribution according to Tukey’s (1977) extreme outlier criterion (e.g., 
latencies above the third quartile plus 3 times the individual’s interquartile range). The data of three 
participants who made more than 50% errors and seemingly reacted to the prime rather than to the 
target were excluded from the analyses. In line with the analyses for Experiment 2, we excluded the 
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data of eight participants who did not remember the test cue pairings correctly at the end of the 
experiment. 
In this study, we defined trials in which the target had the same valence as the outcome with 
which the prime co-occurred in the previous learning phase as congruent trials (e.g., X followed by 
a positive target and Y followed by a negative target). Trials in which the target had the opposite 
valence as the outcome with which the prime co-occurred in the previous learning phase are 
incongruent trials (e.g., X followed by a negative target and Y followed by a positive target). We 
conducted an ANOVA with congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as a within subjects factor and 
context condition as a between subjects factor. The two-way interaction between congruency and 
condition was marginally significant, F(1,37) = 3.95, p = .05, partial η2=.10. Again, in Condition 
Same, reaction times for congruent trials (M = 603 ms, SE = 24.2) were marginally faster than 
reaction times for incongruent trials (M = 615 ms, SE = 26.7), t(20) = 1.938, p = .07, d = .42. In 
Condition Opposite, reaction times for congruent (M = 559 ms, SE = 26.2) and incongruent (M = 
555 ms, SE = 27.5) trials did not differ t(17) = -0.81, ns. Note that the Congruence x Condition 
interaction was not significant when the data of all participants were included in the analyses, 
F(1,45) =1.79, p = .19, partial η2=.04.  
Explicit ratings.  Also for the valence ratings and the causal ratings reported below, only the 
analyses for the participants who showed a correct retrieval of the target co-occurrences will be 
reported. The analysis for the test cues X and Y revealed a significant effect of cue, F(1, 37) = 5.80, 
p = .021, but not of condition, F < 1. We did not find an interaction F(1, 37) = 2.81, p =. 10, partial 
η2=.071. The Pearson correlation between implicit and explicit ratings of the cues X and Y was not 
significantly different from zero, r = .15, ns.  
Causal ratings. For the test cues X and Y the ANOVA did reveal a main effect of the cue, 
F(1, 37) = 17.49, p < .01, partial η2=.32, and a marginal effect of condition, F(1, 37) = 3.50, p = .07, 
partial η2=.09. We found a significant Cue x Condition interaction, F(1, 37) = 13.67, p < .01, partial 
η2=.27. A post-hoc t-test showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(20) = 5.78, p 
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< .01, d = 1.26, but not in condition Opposite, t(17) < 1. Therefore, in condition Same, participants 
indicated that, in a potential new game, the cues X and Y would be followed by the outcome 
predicted by the context rule, whereas in condition Opposite this effect was not present. 
 
General Discussion 
The main aim of our research was to test the influence of context variables on EC of implicit 
evaluations. In three experiments, we compared the implicit evaluations of two target stimuli (X and 
Y) in two conditions that differed only with regard to the context in which the stimuli were 
presented. In both conditions, the test stimuli X and Y were consistently presented in compound 
with another neutral cue (F or H) and consistently followed by the same, positive or negative 
outcome (XF+, YH-). The context was manipulated by presenting the target cues intermixed with 
context cues that were paired with outcomes according to a certain rule. In condition Same, each of 
the context cues was consistently paired with the same outcome, regardless of whether it was 
presented alone or in compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB+; C-, D-, CD-). In condition 
Opposite, each of a series of other context cues was paired with a certain outcome when presented 
alone and with the opposite outcome when presented in a compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB-; 
C-, D-, CD+). Given that in both conditions the target stimulus X always co-occurred with a 
positive outcome and the target stimulus Y always co-occurred with a negative outcome, purely 
associative models of implicit attitudes that take into account only the pairings would predict no 
difference between the conditions. Results showed, however, that the two conditions differed 
significantly in terms of implicit evaluations towards the target cues. Across all three experiments, 
various implicit measures always reflected a preference for the positively paired cue X in condition 
Same. This preference was always absent in condition Opposite. The current results thus 
demonstrate that EC of implicit evaluations can be moderated by rules that are implied by the 
context.  
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We did not, however, find a reversed EC effect in the condition Opposite. The latter finding 
stands in contrast to recent results by Peters and Gawronski (2011, Experiments 1 & 2) who found 
reversed EC of implicit evaluation when participants were verbally instructed after CS-US pairings 
to mentally reverse the valence of the US. More specifically, the authors provided participants with 
information about the personality traits of four fictitious people. Persons A and B were paired in 75 % 
of the cases with positive USs whereas persons C and D were paired  in 75 % of the cases with 
negative USs.  The participants’ task was, for each pairing, to guess whether the information 
provided about each of the four individuals was true or false. Information provided by pairings 
involving persons A and C was said to be true for the frequent valence and false for the infrequent 
valence, whereas the information provided by pairings involving persons B and D was said to be 
false for the frequent valence and true for the infrequent valence. Whereas A was preferred over C 
(i.e., standard EC effect), B was liked less than D (i.e., reversed EC effect). A possible explanation 
for why we did not find such a reversed EC effect might be that we did not directly instruct 
participants about how to interpret the CS-US pairings. Instead, our manipulation was more indirect 
and could have succeeded only if (a) participants noticed the context rule that governed the pairings 
involving the context cues and (b) they actually applied those rules to make inferences about the 
USs that  were paired with the target cues X and Y when these cues  were presented on their own. 
Although we took measures to ensure that participants did encode the context rule, it might be that 
some participants did not actually use the rule to make inferences about the target cues X and Y. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to note that in a related study conducted at our lab, but with a 
simplified rule and the explicit task to state conclusions about the target stimuli (please see Footnote 
3 for details), we did find significant reversed EC. This study was more similar to the studies of 
Peters and Gawronski in that it was much clearer to participants how the CS-US pairings had to be 
interpreted.  
It is also interesting to note that Peters and Gawronski did not find a full reversal when 
participants were only informed about the correct interpretation of the CS-US after all the pairings 
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had been presented, instead of after each trial. It is therefore possible that the presence of the 
relational information at the time of encoding represents a crucial factor in obtaining a reversed EC 
effect. In our studies, particularly in condition Opposite, different participants might have 
discovered the context rule at different moments during the learning phase. Consequently, the 
relational information embedded in the context may have been available at the time of the encoding 
of the CS-US pairings  for only some of the participants. This could explain the lack of a reverse EC 
effect in our studies and its presence in studies in which the encoding of both valenced and 
relational information is ensured to happen at the same time. Again, note that we did find a reversed 
EC effect in a study that resembled the Peters and Gawronski studies (see Footnote 3). Because a 
simpler rule was used in that experiment than in Experiments 1-3, participants might have become 
aware of the rule sooner and have already used this information  during the first presentation of the 
target cues X and Y.  
Regardless of the exact reasons for why we did not observe a reversal of the EC effect in 
Experiments 1-3, the fact that we did find a modulation of EC of implicit evaluations has important 
theoretical implications. First, as we explained in the introduction, purely associative models 
postulate that the experience of pairings should unequivocally lead to the formation of associations 
between the mental representations of those stimuli. Because implicit evaluation is assumed to be 
determined only by associations in memory, one should observe an EC effect that is determined by 
the experienced pairings in a way that is independent of what the context implies about the meaning 
of those pairings. The fact that EC was significantly moderated by the properties of the context in 
which these pairings were experienced does not fit  well with these ideas.  
According to propositional models, on the other hand, the effect of CS-US pairings on liking 
is mediated by the formation of a proposition about the CS-US relation. As the content of this 
proposition depends not only on the CS-US pairings but also on the context in which these pairings 
occur, aspects of the context should be able to moderate the effect of stimulus pairings on liking. 
Hence, we predicted EC effects on implicit measures that are moderated by the context rule that is 
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implemented in the pairings of other stimuli. The most straightforward prediction from these 
models would have been that participants inferred a reversed relation between CS and US in  
condition Opposite, which according to a purely propositional model, should have led to a 
significantly reversed EC effect. The fact that we did not find significant reversal speaks against this 
interpretation. However, propositional models can account for the lack of a reversed EC effect in 
condition Opposite if certain additional assumptions are made. As we explained in the introduction, 
one could assume that participants formed two propositions that are relevant for the evaluation of 
the target stimuli: one determined by the context and one determined by the co-occurrences. Both 
propositions could cancel each other out, resulting in a null implicit evaluation. In sum, the current 
results do not refute a strict propositional model but additional assumptions are needed before such 
a model can explain the exact pattern of results.  
Importantly, the current results can also be explained by a hybrid associative-propositional 
account of EC of implicit evaluations that assumes that both associative and propositional processes 
contribute to such EC effects. As we explained in the introduction, associative and propositional 
processes might cancel each other out in  condition Opposite, which would explain the null-finding 
in this condition. On the other hand, there might be circumstances in which propositional processes 
dominate implicit evaluations, for instance, when unambiguous information is presented about how 
CS-US pairings should be interpreted. This would explain why Peters and Gawronski (2011) did 
find a reversed EC effect when participants were instructed to mentally reverse the meaning of CS-
US pairings (also see Footnote 3). A hybrid account also fits well with the observation of Peters and 
Gawronski that verbal information has a stronger effect when presented immediately after a CS-US 
pairing. In such cases, propositional inferences could overrule the formation of associations based 
on CS-US pairings and thus dominate implicit evaluations (see Peters & Gawronski, 2011, for 
details). Note that these ideas are in line with recent dual process models such as the Associative 
and Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). Regardless of 
whether one favors a strictly propositional account or a hybrid account of our results, it is important 
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to note that our results confirm the idea that propositional processes do (co-)determine EC of 
implicit evaluations (also see Peters & Gawronski, 2011).  
To conclude, our results show that EC of implicit evaluations depends not only on the 
objective CS-US pairings but also on elements in the context that specify the implications of these 
CS-US pairings. Although we are not the first to observe such context effects (i.e., Peters & 
Gawronski, 2011; see Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011, for a study on EC of explicit evaluations), we 
are the first to show that these context effects are not restricted to explicit verbal instructions about 
how CS-US pairings should be interpreted. Our results suggest that context effects in EC of implicit 
evaluations might be widespread and confirm the idea that propositional processes do contribute to 
EC of implicit evaluations.  
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Footnotes 
 
1
 Note that we use the term implicit evaluation to refer to a behavioural phenomenon (i.e., the fact 
that a stimulus evokes an evaluative response automatically) rather than to a type of mental 
representation (e.g., implicit attitudes; see De Houwer, 2009a, 2011). Although the study of implicit 
evaluations imposes limits on theories about the mental representations that mediate implicit 
evaluation, it should not rely on a priori assumptions about the nature of those representations (e.g., 
the assumption that implicit and explicit attitudes are separate entities).  
 
2 
Associative learning is defined as changes in behaviour that are due to relations between events 
(e.g. De Houwer, 2009c). 
 
3
 In a further experiment, we employed a procedure similar to that used in condition Opposite of 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3. The differences with Experiments 1-3 are as follows. First, because we 
were interested mainly in obtaining a reversed EC effect in condition Opposite, only this condition 
was realized. The second important change was made in order to simplify the implementation of the 
context rule. All stimulus compounds consisted of the same cue R in combination with one other 
stimulus. Participants were told that cue R reverses the outcome of the cue with which it is paired, 
and were then presented with A+, AR-, B-, BR+, XR+ and YR-. This rule is less complex than the 
one used in Experiments 1-3 and could be demonstrated with a smaller number of different stimuli. 
A third important change was that participants were asked to make causal judgements about X and 
Y before administrating an IAT that was identical to the IAT of Experiment 1. We implemented this 
change to give participants the opportunity to relate the context rule to the target cues X and Y and 
thus to form the propositions about the target cues that were implied by this information. The D600 
measure was coded and scored as in Experiment 1. As predicted, the D600 measure for the single 
cues X and Y was negative (M = -0.15, SE = 0.49) and significantly different from zero, t(80) = -
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2.98,  p < .01, d = 0.33.
 
In terms of explicit evaluation, the preference for the negatively paired cue 
was significantly different from zero, (M = -1.38, SE = 0.49) t(80) = -2.85, p < .01, d = 2.85. This 
result confirms the findings of Peters and Gawronski (2011) and shows that reverse EC effects of 
implicit evaluation are not specific to the manipulation (verbal information on how to encode the 
pairings vs. rules implied by context pairings ) and stimuli (adjectives describing a person vs. 
nonwords that result in winning or losing) that they used. The causal ratings indicated that the cue 
that was in the losing (winning) compound was deemed, when on its own, more likely to cause win 
(loss) in a potential new game, t(80) = -8.51, p < .01, d = 0.95. Finally, we observed a positive 
correlation between implicit and explicit ratings of the target cues, r = .53, p < .01.  
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 Table 1. Means (and standard errors) of the explicit valence ratings for the target cues in 
Experiments 1 – 3. X was always paired with a positive outcome whereas Y was always 
paired with a negative outcome.  
Experiments Cue Condition Same Condition Opposite 
Experiment 1 
X 6.68 (0.48) 5.07 (0.48) 
Y 3.21 (0.50) 5.68 (0.50) 
Experiment 2 
X 6.10 (0.51) 5.60 (0.59) 
Y 3.90 (0.49) 5.60 (0.56) 
Experiment 3 
X 5.86 (0.40) 4.95 (0.43) 
Y 4.00 (0.40) 4.61 (0.43) 
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Table 2. Means (and standard errors) of the causal ratings for the target cues in Experiment 1 – 3 
 A high score indicates that the cue is deemed to cause a win in a potential new game. X was 
always paired with a positive outcome whereas Y was always paired with a negative 
outcome. 
Experiments Cue Condition Same Condition Opposite 
Experiment 1 
X 7.82 (0.54) 4.64 (0.54) 
Y 1.89 (0.50) 5.89 (0.50) 
Experiment 2 
X 7.30 (0.60) 3.00 (0.69) 
Y 2.05 (0.54) 5.40 (0.63) 
Experiment 3 
X 6.86 (0.59) 3.67 (0.64) 
Y 2.33 (0.50) 3.39 (0.54) 
 
